Abstract-Privacy-preserving recommender systems have been an active research topic for many years. However, until today, it is still a challenge to design an efficient solution without involving a fully trusted third party or multiple semi-trusted third parties. The key obstacle is the large underlying user populations (i.e., huge input size) in the systems. In this paper, we revisit the concept of friendshipbased recommender systems, proposed by Jeckmans et al. and Tang and Wang. These solutions are very promising because recommendations are computed based on inputs from a very small subset of the overall user population (precisely, a user's friends and some randomly chosen strangers). We first clarify the single prediction protocol and Top-n protocol by Tang and Wang, by correcting some flaws and improving the efficiency of the single prediction protocol. We then design a decentralized single protocol by getting rid of the semi-honest service provider. In order to validate the designed protocols, we crawl Twitter and construct two datasets (FMT and 10-FMT) which are equipped with auxiliary friendship information. Based on 10-FMT and MovieLens 100k dataset with simulated friendships, we show that even if our protocols use a very small subset of the datasets, their accuracy can still be equal to or better than some baseline algorithm. Based on these datasets, we further demonstrate that the outputs of our protocols leak very small amount of information of the inputs, and the leakage decreases when the input size increases. We finally show that he single prediction protocol is quite efficient but the Top-n is not. However, we observe that the efficiency of the Top-n protocol can be dramatically improved if we slightly relax the desired security guarantee.
INTRODUCTION
R ECOMMENDER system is one type of information filtering systems that seek to predict the preferences that users would give to an item (e.g., music, book, or movie) they have not yet considered, using a model built from the characteristics of items and/or users. It enables users to make the most appropriate choices from the immense variety of items that are available. Take an online book store as an example, going through the lengthy book catalogue not only wastes a lot of time but also frequently overwhelms users and leads them to make poor decisions. Without recommender systems, the availability of choices, instead of producing a benefit, may downgrade users' experiences. Today, recommender systems play an important role in every corner of our daily life. Two representative types of recommender systems are neighborhood-based and model-based. In a neighborhoodbased recommender system, in order to predict user u's rating for an item i, the system first chooses a neighborhood for user u or the item i then computes the prediction based on data from the neighborhood. In a model-based recommender system, in order to predict user u's rating for an item i, the system first trains a model using all available data then computes the prediction based on the model.
In practice, most existing recommender systems are centralized in the sense that a service provider will collect the inputs from all users and compute recommendations for them. The collected data range from explicit inputs such as ratings to implicit behavior data such as browsing histories and locations. This makes recommender systems a doubleedged sword. On one side users get better recommendations when they reveal more personal data, but on the flip side they sacrifice more privacy if they do so. For instance, Weinsberg et al. [32] showed that what has been rated by a user can already help an attacker identify this user, namely the breach of data privacy may lead to the breach of anonymity. Calandrino et al. [9] proposed inference attacks which allow an attacker with some auxiliary information to infer a user's transactions from temporal changes in the public outputs of a recommender system. More detailed discussions about privacy issues in recommender systems can be found in [4] , [17] .
Related Work
Existing privacy-protection solutions can be generally divided into two categories. The cryptographic solutions (e.g., [1] , [10] , [22] , [25] ) often aim at securing the procedure of underlying recommender protocols, namely they do not consider the information leakage in the outputs. In this category, a typical method is to employ somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme and let all computations be done in encrypted form. Unfortunately, this will incur intolerable complexities and make the solutions impractical. Even though in the neighborhood-based systems, predictions are computed based on a small subset of users'data, a secure solution must compute the neighborhood privately in the first place, and this often introduces a lot of complexity. Moreover, many solutions (e.g., [22] ) introduce additional semi-trusted servers which are difficult to be instantiated in reality. The data-obfuscation solutions (e.g., [24] , [33] ) rely on adding noise to the original data or computation results to protect users' inputs. These solutions usually do not incur complicated manipulations on the users' inputs, so that they are much more efficient. The drawback is that they often lack rigorous privacy guarantees and downgrade the recommendation accuracy to some extent. With respect to privacy guarantees, an exception is the differential privacy based approach (e.g., [3] , [20] , [21] ) which provide mathematically sound privacy notions. However, these solutions either require a trusted third party or need cryptographic primitives for all users to generate the accumulated data subjects.
In order to improve the efficiency of privacy-preserving recommender systems, one typical approach is to design more efficient cryptographic tools. However, even if the speedup is significant in cryptographic sense, it often does not result in practical recommender systems. This is due to the large underlying user populations, which make model training and neighborhood selection unrealistic even with efficient cryptographic tools. Recently, Jeckmans et al. proposed an interesting solution direction in [16] , where they proposed the concept of friendship-based recommender system and gave solutions based on somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes. The rationale behind their concept is the following.
In order to avoid the computationally-cumbersome neighborhood selection step in neighborhood-based recommender systems, the solution leverages auxiliary social network information of the users. This significantly reduces the amount of data used in computing predictions. Trust is a very subtle issue. Friends may trust each other in the sense that their peers will not collude with a third party to leak their information. If a collusion is discovered, then their relationship can be broken. On the other hand, some information may be sensitive among friends, but not with strangers. For instance, if a user has watched a porn movie, then disclosing this to his friends may make him embarrassed, but disclosing it to a stranger may not cause any harm. This motivates the adoption of homomorphic encryption to secure the computation. Later, Tang and Wang [26] pointed out some security flaws in the protocol from [16] and gave improved solutions. All solutions from [16] , [26] rely on the hypothesis that friends share more similar tastes than with strangers without any validation. Moreover, some proper analysis is missing for security and implementation results are missing to demonstrate the efficiency.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we revisit the concept of friendship-based recommender system and the protocols from [16] , [26] . Generally speaking, we validate the hypothesis made in [16] , [26] and comprehensively analyse existing and newly designed protocols. In more detail, our contribution lies in three aspects.
We construct and analyze two Twitter datasets (i.e., FMT and 10-FMT) by defining friendship based on the following activities in Twitter. Based on 10-FMT, we experimentally validate the hypothesis that friends are more similar in the movie rating behaviors. Besides serving for evaluating our recommender protocols, the datasets are of independent interests for the community. We clarify the single prediction and Top-n protocols from [26] and correct some flaws in their specifications. The clarified single prediction protocol is more efficient than the original one. We further propose a new decentralized single prediction protocol, by getting rid of the service provider and basing its security solely on the semi-honest assumption among friends. We analyze the performances of the protocols. First, we evaluate the recommendation accuracy of our protocols and show that they can achieve better accuracy than some baseline algorithm. Second, we analyse the security of our protocols. Since the security of protocol executions is straightforwardly guaranteed by the underlying homomorphic encryption scheme, we focus on the information leakage in algorithm outputs. Third, regarding computational complexity, we provide both asymptotic and implementation results for the protocols. We show that the single prediction protocol is very efficient while the Top-n protocol is not. We further discuss two relaxations for the top-n protocol and show that they are quite efficient.
Organization
In Section 2, we present preliminaries on notation and building blocks. In Section 3, we recap the rating prediction algorithms from [16] and [26] . In Section 4, we construct and analyse two Tweeter datasets. In Section 5, we clarify the single prediction and Top-n protocols from [26] . In Section 6, we present a decentralized privacy-preserving single prediction protocol. In Section 7, we analyze the accuracy properties of the protocols. In Section 8, we analyze the security properties of the protocols. In Section 9, we analyze the complexity properties of the protocols. In Section 10, we conclude the paper.
PRELIMINARY
When X is a set, x $ X means that x is chosen from X uniformly at random, and jXj means the size of X. If x is a distribution, then s x means that s is sampled according to x. We use bold letter, such as X, to denote a vector. Given two vector X and Y, we use X Á Y to denote their inner product. We use k X k to denote the euclidean length of X.
In a recommender system, the item set is denoted by I ¼ ð1; 2; . . . ; b; . . . ; MÞ, and a user x's ratings are denoted by a vector R x ¼ ðr x;1 ; . . . ; r x;b ; . . . ; r x;M Þ. The rating value is often an integer from f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5g. If item i has not been rated, then r x;i is set to be 0. The ratings are often organized in a rating matrix. The functionality of a recommender system is to predict the unrated r x;i values. Given two rating vectors R x and R y from users x and y, their Cosine similarity is computed as follows.
With respect to R x , a binary vector Q x ¼ ðq x;1 ; . . . ; q x;b ; . . . ; q x;M Þ is defined as follows: q x;b ¼ 1 iff r x;b 6 ¼ 0 for every 1 b M. Basically, Q x indicates which items have been rated by user x. We further use r x to denote user x's average rating, namely d
Many metrics can be used to measure the recommendation quality of a recommender protocol. In this paper, we use Mean Absolute Error (MAE), defined as follows.
where G is the set of predicted ratings,r u;i is the predicted rating and r u;i is the real rating value. Note that lower MAE implies more accurate recommendations.
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption
Since the breakthrough work of Gentry [14] , many somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) schemes have been proposed (e.g., the BV scheme [8] , BGV scheme [7] , YASHE scheme [6] 
TAILORED PREDICTION ALGORITHMS
In this section, we briefly review the prediction algorithms from [16] , [26] . We refer to the algorithm from [16] as the JPH algorithm, and the algorithm from [26] as the TW algorithm.
JPH Prediction Algorithm
Given a user u, let his friend set be F u . The JPH prediction algorithm is defined as follows, where w u;f and w f;u are the weights that users u and f assign to each other
In [16] , the authors only discussed the security properties of their solutions without touching upon the performances.
In practice, friends share similar tastes may imply they also have rated similar items. Therefore, if user u has not rated item b then it is very likely that very few friends have rated the item b. If this happens, the predicated value from Equation (1) may not be very accurate (cold start problem). In Section 7.3, we validate this argument with experimental results. In fact, this partially motivates the inclusion of strangers in TW prediction algorithms.
Revised TW Prediction Algorithm
Given an active user u, when factoring in the inputs from randomly chosen strangers, we will use the simple Bias From Mean (BFM) scheme for the purpose of simplicity. It is worth stressing that there are a lot of different choices for this task. Nevertheless, as to the accuracy, this scheme has similar performance to many other more sophisticated schemes, such as Slope One and Pearson/Cosine similarity-based collaborative filtering schemes [19] . Let the stranger set be T u , the predicted value p Ã u;b for item b is computed as follows
Note that we put a factor 1 2 in the computation, which means that the weight of a stranger's contribution to the output is set to be 1 2 . In [26] , this factor is set to 1 by default and implies that a stranger's weight to the output is higher than that of a friend. Even though in principle this factor can be flexibly set in the range of ½0; 1 but we argue that 1 2 is more appropriate than 1 because a friend should naturally contribute more to the output in a friendship-based recommender system.
When factoring in the inputs from the friends, we make two changes to Equation (1) . One is to only take into account the weight value from user u. This makes more sense because how important a friend means to user u is a subjective matter for u only. The other is to compute the predication based on both u's average rating and the weighted rating deviations from his friends. Let the friend set be F u , the predicted value p ÃÃ u;b for item b is computed as follows
In practice, the similarity between friends means that they tend to prefer similar items. However, this does not imply that they will assign very similar scores to the items. For example, a user Alice may be very mean and assign a score 3 to most of her favorite items while her friends may be very generous and assign a score 5 to their favorite items. Using the Equation (1), we will likely generate a score 5 for an unrated item for Alice, who may just rate a score 3 for the item even if she likes it. In this regard, Equation (3) is more appropriate because r u reflects the user's rating style and
reflects the user's preference based on inputs from his friends.
Based on the inputs from the strangers and friends, a combined predicted value p u;b for an unrated item b can be
Due to the fact that cryptographic primitives are often designed for dealing with integers, we rephrase the formula as follows, where a; b are integers
It is worth noting that the prediction p u;b is not deterministic because we assume the stranger set T u is randomly chosen for the computation.
CONSTRUCTION AND ANALYSIS OF TWITTER DATASETS
In this section, we construct two new datasets based on the MovieTweetings dataset [11] (abbreviated as MT dataset), which does not contain any friendship information. Based on the "following" activities in Twitter, we naturally introduce the concept of friendship as follows: if a user x follows user y then we say user x regards user y as a friend. Note that friendship is not guaranteed to be bi-directional, namely users x and y may not consider each other as friends at the same time.
Dataset Construction
MovieTweetings consists of ratings on movies that are extracted from tweets [11] . Such tweets originate from the social rating widget available in IMDb apps. To construct our new datasets, we use a snapshot of the MT dataset which contains 359908 ratings, 35456 users and 20156 items. Note that in this dataset each user has at least 1 rating. Since the MT dataset does not contain friendship information, we crawled the followees of each user ID recorded in it to create two new datasets with friendship information.
In the FMT dataset, each user has at least 1 friend and each friend has at least 1 rating. In the 10-FMT dataset, each user has at least 10 friends and each friend has at least 10 ratings. The specification for both datasets is in [30] . It is worth stressing that, in the new datasets, we only collect the Twitter users who have explicitly posted their movie ratings. In another word, the friend list of a user may be incomplete. The rating scale is regularized to [0, 5] . We summarize some basic information of these datasets in the following 
Hypothesis Validation
In order to test the folklore that friends share more similarities than strangers, we compute the Cosine similarities between users in the 10-FMT dataset and plot them in Fig. 1 . Based on the fact that most " dots are distributed above t u dots, we can conclude that friends typically share more similarities than strangers.
Other Characteristics
We summarize some simple facts of the 10-FMT dataset in Table 1 . Note that, besides friends, we also count the number of friends of friends (FoFs), which are used in designing the decentralized protocol. 
CENTRALIZED FRIENDSHIP-BASED PROTOCOLS
In this section, we first describe our centralized setting for recommender systems. Then, we describe two privacy-preserving protocols based on those from [26] .
The Centralized Setting
A recommender system often has a large population of users, who may not know each other. Therefore, a common recommender service provider is always required to provide the communication platform for users to jointly run the recommender protocols. This leads us to assume a centralized setting for protocol design. We generally assume that there is a recommender service provider, which will maintain the social graph and mediate the executions of recommender protocols among users. The system structure is shown in Fig. 2 . With respect to the tailored recommender algorithms in Section 3, the global system parameters should be established in advance. Such parameters should include a; b which determine how a predicted rating value for user u is generated based on the inputs of friends and strangers, and they should also include the size of stranger set T u . In the initialization phase, user u generates his public/private key pair ðPK u ; SK u Þ for a SWHE scheme and sends PK u to the server. We require that the SWHE scheme allows to encrypt negative integers. In addition, user u maintains a rating vector R u , his social graph, and assigns a weight w u;f to each of his friend f 2 F u . All other users perform the same operations in this phase.
Centralized Single Prediction Protocol
When user u wants to test whether the predicted rating for an unrated item b is above a certain threshold t (an integer) in his mind, he initiates the protocol in Fig. 3 . Referring to the prediction algorithm from Section 3.2, in stage 1 the service provider collects the inputs from the strangers in encrypted form according to Equation (2), while in stage 2 the service provider collects the inputs from the friends in encrypted form according to Equation (3) . In stage 3, user u learns whether the prediction is above a threshold while the service provider learns nothing. In more detail, the protocol runs in three stages. The server first sends PK u to some randomly chosen strangers, and see whether they want to participate in the computation. c) After the server has successfully found a viable stranger set T u , it forwards ½I b u to every user in T u . d) With PK u and ðR t ; Q t Þ, every user t from T u can compute the following based on the homomorphic properties 2) In the second stage, the participants interact as follows. a) For every friend f 2 F u , user u sends the encrypted weight ½w u;f u ¼ EncðPK u ; w u;f Þ to the server. b) The server sends ½w u;f u and ½I b u to user f. c) With PK u , ½I b u , ½w u;f u and ðR f ; Q f Þ, user f can compute the following 3) In the third stage, user u and the server interact as follows.
a) The server first computes ½n T u , ½d T u , ½n F u , ½d F u as shown in Fig. 3 Referring to Equations (2) and (3), we have p
The ultimate prediction p u;b can be denoted as follows
b) User u runs a comparison protocol COM with the server to learn whether X Y ! t À r u . Since X; Y; t À r u are integers, COM is indeed an encrypted integer comparison protocol: where user u holds the private key sk u and t, the server holds ½X u ; ½Y u , and the protocol outputs a bit to user u indicating whether X ! ðt À r u Þ Á Y . Compared to the protocol from [26] , we have made the following changes: (1) given the fact that the service provider is semi-trusted, the strangers do not need to validate PK u any more; (2) the strangers are chosen from the whole population while they are chosen from FoFs in [26] Fig. 3 from [26] . Note also that the prediction formula is also different from that in [26] .
Centralized Top-n Protocol
When the active user u wants to figure out Top-n unrated items, he initiates the protocol in Fig. 4 . This protocol shares the same design philosophy as that of single prediction protocol. The usage of matrix M X in the random permutation of Stage 3 guarantees that the rated items will all appear in the end of the list after ranking. As a result, the rated items will not appear in the recommended Top-n items. In more detail, the protocol runs in three stages. 1) In the first stage, the participants interact as follows.
a) The server sends PK u to some randomly chosen strangers and see whether they want to participate in the computation. Suppose that the server has successfully found T u . b) With PK u and ðR t ; Q t Þ, user t 2 T u can compute ½q User u encrypts the matrices (element by element) and sends ½M X u ; ½M Y u to the server, which then proceeds as follows.
i) The server first computes ½n T;b u , ½d T;b u , ½n F;b u , ½d F;b u , ½X b u , ½Y b u for every 1 b M as shown in Fig. 4 , in the same way as in the previous protocol in Fig. 3 . Referring to Formula (4), we see that r u appears in p u;b for every b. For simplicity, we ignore this term when comparing the predictions for different unrated items. With this simplification, the prediction p u;b can be denoted as follows
ii) The server permutes the ciphertexts vector in an oblivious manner as follows
The multiplication between the ciphertext matrix and ciphertext vector is done in the standard way, except that the multiplication between two elements is done with EvalðÁ; ; Þ and the addition is done with Evalðþ; ; Þ. Suppose item b has been rated before and ð½X b u ; ½Y b u Þ is permuted to ð½U i u ; ½V i u Þ, then U i ¼ 0 since the element 1 in bth column has been set to 0. b) Based on some RANK protocol, the server sorts
ð1 i jBÞj in the encrypted form. One straightforward way of constructing the RANK protocol is to combine an encrypted integer comparison protocol COM and any standard sorting algorithm. The COM protocol has slightly different semantics from that in the previous protocol in Section 5.2: user u has the private key and the service provider has two encrypted integers, at the end of the protocol the service provider learns the result. c) After the ranking, the server sends the "Topn" indexes (e.g., the permuted Top-n indexes) to user u, who can then recover the real Top-n indexes based on the permutation he has done. Compared to the protocol from [26] , we have made the following changes: (1) given the fact that the service provider is semi-trusted, the strangers does not need to validate PK u any more; (2) the strangers are chosen from the whole population while they are chosen from FoFs in [26] ; (3) we correct two errors in the computation of ½X b u and ½d F;b u in Fig. 4 from [26] .
DECENTRALIZED FRIENDSHIP-BASED PROTOCOL
In reality, semi-honest service provider is often viewed as a security weakness in protocol design. This motivates us to investigate privacy-preserving protocols in fully decentralized setting. Next, we first describe the setting and then present a decentralized single prediction protocol. Since we can extend the protocol to a Top-n variant in the same way as we have done in the centralized setting, we skip the details here.
The Decentralized Setting
For simplicity, we assume that users are uniquely identified in the recommender system, and they share their social graph with their friends. In the initialization phase, user u generates his public/private key pair ðPK u ; SK u Þ for a SWHE scheme. In addition, user u maintains a rating vector R u , his social graph, and assigns a weight w u;f to each of his friend f 2 F u . All other users perform the same operations in this phase. Before going ahead, we want to point out that we choose a FoF as stranger in the following solution for the simplicity of description. In the view of user u, the topology is shown in Fig. 5 . Due to the small world phenomenon, the population of FoFs can already be very large (see [2] and Section 4.3).
Decentralized Single Prediction Protocol
Next, we describe a protocol for user u to check whether p u;i ! t according to Formula (4) in Section 3. It can be regarded as a decentralized version of the single prediction protocol from Section 5.2. 1) Based on the social graph (particularly his friend set F u ), user u chooses a stranger set T u , consisting of his FoFs. He also chooses t Ã 2 T u . We further require that the every f 2 F u should have at least one friend in T u . 2) User u generates a binary vector I b , which only has 1 for the bth element, and broadcasts ½I b u ¼ EncðPK u ; 
Comparison to Centralized Protocol
In contrast to the centralized protocol from Section 5.2, the task of the semi-honest service provider is distributed to the "strangers", namely FoFs of user u. The overall computational complexity stays the same. The reason we have chosen the strangers to handle most of the computations is to reduce the complexity of the friends. In reality, the number of friends will be very limited, while the number of FoFs is much larger so that the chance a FoF is chosen is quite low. If we assume trust can propagate through a chain of friends, then the strangers can be chosen more freely in the above solution. In comparison to the protocol from Section 5.2, this solution has the following advantages.
The users do not need to semi-trust the service provider any more. User u can select the users (his friends and FoFs) to compute recommendations for himself. In order to do this, user u needs to maintain a social graph (at least his friends and FoFs). However, it also has the following disadvantages.
User u's FoFs need to perform more computations. Basically, the workload of the service provider has been shifted to them. This may become a heavy burden for the users. Users need to put more trust on their friends and FoFs, particularly on the user t Ã . The users cannot leverage the service provider to blend their inputs anymore, and the trust has been shifted to user user t Ã . In theory, this can be avoided by a secure multiparty computation protocol, but this will significantly increase the complexity. Clearly, from the efficiency perspective, the centralized solution from Section 5.2 is more realistic in practice. In order to reduce the trust on the service provider, we can (at least) add two layers of validations on its behaviors. One is that, before participating in the protocol execution, a stranger can ask the service provider to provide a chain of friends so that he can validate the public key PK u . The other is that user u can ask the service provider to prove that it has performed the required operations honestly.
ACCURACY PROPERTIES OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
In this section, we investigate the recommendation accuracy of the prediction algorithms from Section 3, with respect to both centralized and decentralized settings where strangers are chosen differently therein. Because the 10-FMT dataset may be biased due to the fact that most of users don't post their movie ratings to Twitter, we also use MovieLens 100k dataset [23] with simulated friendships. Interestingly, the results align well in both datasets. In the experiments, we randomly split each data set into training set (80 percent) and testing set (20 percent). Note that in order to test all the users each time, instead of randomly splitting the original data sets in form of triplets (user id, item id, rating), we randomly split each user's rating history into training set (80 percent) and testing set (20 percent). In each test, a user's friends are randomly selected from his friend-set, the strangers are also randomly chosen. The MAE values summarized in the following tables are the mean value of their corresponding 5-fold cross validation.
Accuracy in Centralized Setting
With respect to the 10-FMT dataset, the MAE of the revised TW algorithm from Section 3.2 is summarized in Table 2 . Due to the fact that a user has limited number of friends in the 10-FMT dataset, we only compute MAE up to 50 friends. The column denotes the possible values of a aþb and the row denotes the possible values of ðjF u j; jT u jÞ, where strangers are randomly sampled. Lower MAE implies more accurate recommendations.
With respect to the MovieLens 100 k dataset, we define friends and strangers as follows. Given a user u, we first calculate the Cosine similarities with all other users and generate a neighborhood for user u. Then, we choose a certain number of users from the top-K f most similar neighbors as the friends (In this paper, K f ¼ 250.), and randomly choose a certain number of users from the rest as strangers. The MAE of the revised TW algorithm from Section 3.2 is summarized in Table 3 . According to the accuracy results by Lemire and Maclachlan (in Table 1 of [19] where the values are MAE divided by 4), their smallest MAE is 0:752 ¼ 0:188 Â 4. We can get similar or lower MAE when jF u j ! 70 by adjusting a aþb . From the numbers in Table 2 and Table 3 , there is a general trend that MAE decreases when friends number increases. We plot some columns of both tables for a better illustration, shown in Fig 6. When the numbers of friends and strangers are fixed, the contribution factor a aþb also plays a role in determining recommendation accuracy. We plot some rows of both tables for a better illustration, shown in Fig 7. The MAE decreases when a aþb increases (i.e., friends has more contribution) on the MovieLens 100k dataset, while the MAE slightly increases when a aþb grows higher than 0.6 on the 10-FMT dataset.
Accuracy in Decentralized Setting
For the decentralized setting, we compute the MAE on both datasets and present them in Tables 4 and 5 The MAE values are very close to those in Tables 2 and 3 , so that we can conclude that the recommendation accuracy is similar in both settings. It implies that sampling strangers from FoFs does not bring much accuracy gain with respect to both datasets.
Accuracy of JPH Prediction Algorithm
Since strangers are not considered in the JPH prediction algorithm from Section 3.1, we compute the MAEs by only considering friends. For comparison, we assume all the friends are rational, and let w u;f þw f;u 2 equal to the Cosine similarity between user u and friend f. With respect to the 10-FMT and MovieLens 100k dataset, the MAE results are summarized in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. Clearly, their accuracy is much worse than our protocols which is mainly due to two reasons.
JPH employs a very naive neighborhood-based method which can not capture users' rating preference. For example, some users prefer to give high ratings while some others lean to give low ratings. In reality, the data sets are very sparse and imbalanced. It may arise more serious cold-start problem to collaborative filtering techniques, including neighborhood-based method, if only using friends' rating information for predication. This validates our argument in Section 3.1.
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
In the full paper [27] , we formally describe two security models. In the basic security model, the service provider is assumed to be semi-honest, which means it will follow the protocol specification and does not participate in the protocol as a user. Moreover, a user trusts his friends to be semi-honest. As to communication channel among users, it is assumed that all communications are protected with respect to integrity and confidentiality (with forward secrecy). In the worst-case security model, it is assumed that some friends can be compromised. The protocols from Section 5 and 6 are secure in both models based on the facts that all computations are done in the encrypted form under user u's public key and the comparison protocol is secure. It is worth noting that in these protocols the server does not need to generate any key pair for the SWHE scheme. As a result, the protocols are immune to key recovery attacks, in contrast to the JPH offline protocol [16] , [26] . We skip the straightforward security reduction in this paper.
Next, we experimentally study the information leakages from recommendation outputs. We take the centralized protocols (where strangers are involved in the computation) as an example, and leave out the decentralized protocol which has similar results.
Inference from Outputs
In the security models [27] , the potential information leakages from the output of a recommender system is not considered. Intuitively, this kind of leakage depends on the global parameters a; b and the sizes of F u and T u . If a aþb gets larger or the size of T u gets smaller, then the inputs from friends contribute more to the final output of user u. This will in turn make inference attacks easier against the friends but harder against the strangers. In the protocol design, we explicitly prevent user u from communicating with the strangers, therefore, user u will not trivially know whether a specific user t has been involved in the computation. The strangers are independently chosen in different protocol executions and the same stranger is unlikely to be involved in more than one executions, so that it is difficult for an attacker to leverage the accumulated information. Furthermore, we note the fact that there are many users in recommender systems but only 6 possible rating values for any item. This means that many users would give the same rating value r t;b for the item b. With respect to the single prediction protocol, even if r t;b is leaked, user u will not be able to link it to user t.
With respect the revised TW algorithm from Section 3.2, a friend f's contribution to p u;b is protected by the inputs from users in F u nf and the strangers in T u . Similarly, a stranger t's contribution to p u;b is protected by the inputs from users in F u and strangers in T u nt. We perform some experiments to show how a single friend or stranger influences the predicted rating values. We use the both the 10-FMT and MovieLens 100k datasets, and set a aþb ¼ 0:8. For illustration purpose, we only consider two settings, namely ðjF u j; jT u jÞ ¼ ð10; 10Þ and ðjF u j; jT u jÞ ¼ ð30; 10Þ.
Take the setting ðjF u j; jT u jÞ ¼ ð10; 10Þ as an example, we perform the following experiment to test a friend's influence. In the experiment, we run 5-fold cross validation 50 times. In each 5-fold cross validation, we fix the friends of all users in the dataset by randomly selecting 11 friends for each user at the beginning, say each user has a fixed friend list L. Then for each user in the test set, the following procedure is carried out. 1) Randomly choose 10 strangers. 2) Randomly exclude 1 friend f 0 from the list L. Compute the predicted ratings of user u in the test set. Let the prediction vector be denoted as P 0 . 3) Randomly exclude 1 friend f 1 (f 0 6 ¼ f 1 ) from the list L. Compute the predicted ratings of user u in the test set. Let the prediction vector be denoted as P 1 . 4) Compute the prediction difference vector as P 0 À P 1 . Experiments for testing a stranger's influence and for the ðjF u j; jT u jÞ ¼ ð30; 10Þ setting can be designed in a similar manner. After obtaining all prediction difference vectors P 0 À P 1 in the experiments, we plot the frequency of all difference values in Fig. 8 for the 10-FMT dataset and in Fig. 9 for the MovieLens 100k dataset. From the figures, it is obvious that an individual's influence to the output is quite small. In particular, a friend's influence becomes smaller when the friend set becomes larger. Another observation is that a stranger's influence is much smaller than a friend, but it stays almost the same when the friend set becomes larger.
Remark on Fig. 8 
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate the computational complexities of the protocols from Section 5.2 and 5.3. Since it is easy to infer the complexity of the decentralized protocol from the centralized one, we skip the details.
Asymptotic Analysis
With respect to the computational complexity of the proposed protocols, we first count the number of different computations required. For the single prediction protocol, the numbers of SWHE-related operations are listed in Table 8 . COM will be executed once. For the Top-n protocol, the numbers of SWHE-related operations are listed in Table 9 . In addition, if we instantiate the RANK protocol with the well-known Heapsort algorithm, the COM protocol needs to be executed OðMlog MÞ times. 
Implementation Results
We instantiate a COM protocol based on that of Veugen [28] and evaluate its performance. In addition to the SWHE scheme based on YASHE [6] , the protocol also relies Goldwasser-Micali scheme [15] . In both schemes, we set the bitlength of the prime number to be 512. We implement the Goldwasser-Micali scheme, which has the timing cost for Enc (1.5 ms), Dec (4.5 ms), based on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-5600U CPU 2.60GHz. In executing the COM protocol, the computation time for the client and the server is roughly 0.45 ms and 2.82 ms respectively. We adopt the MovieLens 100k dataset where M ¼ 1682 and set ðjF u j; jT u jÞ ¼ ð70; 10Þ. We use the Microsoft SEAL library [12] based on YASHE scheme. The timing information of the SEAL lib is Enc (42 ms), Dec (41 ms), EvalðÁ; ; Þ (305 ms), Evalðþ; ; Þ (85 ms). The timing information of our protocols is shown in Table 10 , and the source code is in [29] .
Regardless the resource-constrained testing environment, it is clear that the Top-n protocol is very inefficient. The complexity mainly comes from the fact that we want to restrict user u to only learn the Top-n recommendations and prevent the server from learning any information. As such, there are two possible directions to relax the security guarantee and get better efficiency.
One is to let user u learn more information (denoted as Relax-1 in Table 11 ). Referring to the protocol specification in Section 5.3, in stage 3, user u does not need to generate M X ; M Y and the server does not need to compute ð½U 1 u ; ½U 2 u ; . . . ; ½U M u Þ and ð½V 1 u ; ½V 2 u ; . . . ; ½V M u Þ. There is no need to perform the ranking, the server just sends ½X b u ; ½Y b u for every 1 b M to user u, who can decrypt these ciphertexts and obtain the Top-n recommendations. The other is to let the server learn how many items user u has rated (denoted as Relax-2 in Table 11 ). In addition, we need to assume that the strangers will not collude with the server. Referring to the protocol specification in Section 5.3, in stage 1 and 2, user u generates a random permutation for the items in the item set and share the permutation information with the friends and strangers. In stage 3, user u does not need to generate M X ; M Y and the server does not need to compute ð½U 1 u ; ½U 2 u ; . . . ; ½U M u Þ and ð½V 1 u ; ½V 2 u ; . . . ; ½V M u Þ. In stage 3, user u tells the server which items has been rated (the indices 
Mþ jF u j 0 0 of these items have been permuted), and they interactively perform the ranking for the unrated items in the encrypted form as before.
CONCLUSION
In the paper, we have refined the protocols from [26] and proposed a new decentralized single prediction protocol.
We have also provided detailed analysis to recommendation accuracy, inference attacks, and computational complexities. The idea of introducing randomly selected strangers to prevent information leakages from the output share some similarity with the differential privacy based approach [21] , [31] and the differential identifiability approach [18] . A more rigorous comparison remains as an interesting future work, particularly in the line of the works from [5] , [13] . With respect to accuracy analysis, it is an interesting future work to perform a study on an unbiased real-world dataset.
